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does not have to bargain on work contracted out which cannot be
performed by his employees. Likewise, the employer will not be
guilty of a violation of the Act by refusing to bargain if he has
formerly contracted out work in the" past, or if there is a labormanagement contract reserving to him the right to subcontract,
even if the work could be performed by his employees.
Although it is apparent that the court does not wish to extinguish management prerogatives, the employer should still place
a provision in the labor-management contract expressly reserving
such prerogatives.81 The Board will more readily reserve a subject
to management where there is a contract provision relating to it.
In doing so, the Board recognizes that the nature of a contract is
such that there is bargaining before there is agreement. Without
such provision, however, the Board's decisions on the matters subject to mandatory collective bargaining will continue to turn on the
particular facts of each case.

LIEN LAw - SEcTION 39-a - MEAsURE OF DAMAGES FOR
ExcEssIvE CLAIM LIMITED SOLELY TO A OUNT WILLFULLY
EXAGGERATED. - In a recent action to foreclose a mechanic's lien,

the defendant counterclaimed for a declaration that the lien was
void as a result of the lienor's willful exaggeration of the amount
due. In addition, .the defendant asked for damages, pursuant to
Section 39-a of the Lien Law,1 in an amount equal to the difference
between the total amount of the lien filed and the amount found
due. The lienor contended that if any damages at all were owing
to the defendant, they should include only the willfully overstated
amounts and not honest discrepancies. A divided Court of Appeals,
although declaring the lien void, nonetheless accepted the lienor's
contention as to damages and held that section 30-a was designed
to permit recovery only in the amount of willful exaggeration.
Goodman v. Del-Sa-Co. Foods, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 191, - N.E.2d
N.Y.S.2d - (1965).
Prior to any statutory authority for invalidating liens which
were willfully exaggerated, a judicial practice evolved in some
courts to declare such liens void on the theory that the exaggeration
did not meet the requirements of the statement of value in the
-,

31
Although it is advisable to include a management prerogative clause
in a contract, it seems to be established that management cannot negotiate on
this issue with a "take it or leave it' attitude. See General Elec. Co.,
150 N.L.R.B. No. 36 (1964); Shell Oil Co., supra note 30.

' N.Y. LIEN LAw § 39-a.
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notice of lien.2 Thus, in Aeschliman v. Presbyterian Hosp.,3 a
lien willfully exaggerated by over two thousand dollars was held
void, since an intentionally false claim was not in accord with
the purpose of the notice of lien.4
This practice was subsequently codified, in New York, in
Section 39 of the Lien Law which voids willfully exaggerated
liens.5 Inbred in this section is the requirement that the element
of willfulness be shown in order to establish a defense to the
foreclosure 4
In supplementing this section, the legislature also
enacted section 39-a which declares that the person filing such
an exaggerated lien shall be liable in damages for "an amount
equal to the difference by which the amount claimed to be due
or to become due . . . exceeded the amount actually due or to
become due thereon." 7 However, the section further provides

that such damages can be awarded only where the lien has been held
void in an action or proceeding to enforce it.
The legislative history of both sections is unclear. The Joint
Legislative Committee to Investigate the Lien Law, which recommended the enactment of these sections to the legislature, did not
offer specific commentary on them, despite the fact that the
explanation of other sections was often elaborate.8 From this it can
be surmised that the Committee considered these sections selfexplanatory.
In the case of Durand Realty Co. v. Stolman, the appellate
division, in construing sections 39 and 39-a, held that the issue
of damages must be raised by a counterclaim in the foreclosure
proceeding, and that the burden is on the claimant to establish the
amount of recovery.9 The court, in noting that section 39-a was
2BLANC,

MECHANIcS'

Lmes

§ 39b (1949), and cases therein cited.

3 165 N.Y. 296, 59 N.E. 148 (1901).

4Id. at 302, 59 N.E. at 149-50. Indication of the amount due in the
notice of lien constitutes the statement of the lienor's claim, omission of which

is fatal, since the notice of lien then falls short of performing its functionnotice. BLANC, op. cit. supra note 2, at § 38e; see N.Y. LmN LAW § 9(5).

5 Not only does § 39 of the Lien Law void a willfully exaggerated lien,
but it also precludes the filing of a subsequent lien for the same claim. See
LIEBEa

AN, BUILDING CONSTRUCTION CON'RACTS AND MECHANIcs' LmE

67 (1939).

LAW

6 Yonkers Builders Supply Co. v. Petro Luciano & Son, Inc., 269 N.Y.
171, 176, 199 N.E. 45, 47 (1935).
The same rule is applied in Minnesota.
Delyea v. Turner, 264 Minn. 169, -, 118 N.W2d 436, 440 (1962).
7 Supra note 1.
s Report of the Joint Legislative Committee to Investigate the Lien Law,
N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 72 (1930).
The purpose of the committee was to
"investigate, study and consider the subject of liens . . . for the purpose of
establishing equitable rights and harmonioms relations among the several
interests affected by such liens." Id. at 3. (Emphasis added.)
9 197 Misc. 208, 94 N.Y.S.2d 358 (Sup. Ct. 1949), aff'd mem., 280 App.
Div. 758, 113 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1st Dep't 1952); accord, Joe Smith, Inc. v.
Otis-Charles Corp., 279 App. Div. 1, 107 N.Y.S.2d 233 (4th Dep't 1951),
aff'd "tem., 304 N.Y. 684, 107 N.E.2d 598 (1952), where it was said that the
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penal, concluded that the intention of the legislature was to
provide a remedy only for willful exaggeration. Honest differences,
therefore, were not within the statute. It is significant to note
here that the references to willful exaggeration were mere dicta
and that the court was determining only whether the issue of
damages could be raised by a separate action begun subsequent
to the foreclosure proceeding.
Apparently the only reported case' 0 permitting recovery
under section 39-a is Hutchinson Roofing & Sheet Metal Co. v.
Gilbert Constr. Corp.," in which a terse memorandum opinion
was written indicating only that "defendant was entitled to recover
damages on account of the exaggerated lien." ' 2 The record on
was entered for the exact
appeal, however, states that judgment
3
amount of the weillful exaggeration.1
In the instant case, the Court, relying on dicta in the cases
previously discussed, stated that the legislature obviously did not
envision the present factual situation. It was observed that "the
draftsman of the statute was thinking of the simple situation where
the entire amount of the exaggeration was willful." 1 The Court
the "absurdity" of allowing recovery due to honest
also noted
5
mistake.1

Since the Court recognized the highly penal character of the
statute, it concluded that the clearest language was necessary
Furthermore, the
to make an honest exaggeration unlawful.
majority reasoned that if the statute "were held to impose a penalty
measured by a discrepancy due to honest mistake it might well
be unconstitutional." 16
The short, vigorous dissent, written by Chief judge Desmond,
however, insisted that section 39-a was plain and unambiguous,
and therefore should have been literally construed. In analyzing
the legislative intent, the minority concluded that where there was
a willful exaggeration, the legislature, in order to put "sharp
teeth" into its enactment, consciously provided a penalty equal to
the total amount of exaggeration. In concluding, Judge Desmond
summarily dismissed the contention of unconstitutionality. 7
penalty of section 39-a is drastic and the section is to be strictly construed in
favor of the person upon whom the penalty is sought to be imposed.
10 Goodman v. Del-Sa-Co. Foods, Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 191, 198, - N.E2d -,
-,
N.Y.S.2d-, - (1965).
1275 App. Div. 1048 (2d Dep't 1949).
12 Ibid.

3 Supra note 10, at 198, - N.E2d at -N.Y.S.2d at -. However,
the record fails to indicate whether there was an honest discrepancy in issue.
S4Id. at 195, - N.E.2d at -N.Y.S.2d at -.
15 Id. at 196, - N.E.2d at -, - N.Y.S.2d at -.
This position is prediN.Y.S2d at 1d. at 197, - N.E.2d at -cated on the fact that the legislature cannot arbitrarily provide any penalty
and at the same time fulfill the requirements of due process.
17 Id. at 199-200, - N.E.2d at -, ' N.Y.S.2d at -.
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The general rule of statutory construction and interpretation is
that when the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, there
is no need to look elsewhere for its meaning.' 8 However, as in
the instant case, where there is a lack of clear legislative intent,
and where the statute when construed literally produces drastic
results, 19 the court can resort to "quick judicial surgery" to avoid
serious consequences. 20 Thus, as previously observed, since there
was no direct commentary on section 39-a by the legislative committee which recommended it, the Court was justified in performing this operation.
The majority further predicated their decision on the questionable constitutional character of a literal interpretation of the statute.
It is a significant rule of constitutional law, however, that a police
regulation is not rendered invalid by the fact that it incidentally
affects constitutional rights. Any regulation, supported by the
indefinable limits of the police power, 2' will necessarily come in
conflict with some right.
It has been said that "the police power extends to all the
great public needs."

2

Thus, if the legislature intended to provide

a penalty for the full amount of exaggeration in order to underscore its condemnation of willfully overstated liens, then the statute
would have a legitimate public purpose and hence be constitutional.
This, seemingly, is the rationale underlying the dissent's view
's See SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §§234-36 (1891); Note,
Intrinsic and Extrinsic Aids to Statutory Construction: Ohio State Bar
Association Committee Reports, 26 U. CINc. L. REv. 299, 300 (1957).
19 Supra note 10, at 196, - N.E2d at -, - N.Y.S2d at -.
The Court
was here taking the first important step in a construction process adequately
described in the following passage: "The cases demonstrate that where
literal construction of a statute will produce an unjust result the dictates of
propriety and justice will be used as guides to the true legislative intent 'In
statutory construction the courts endeavor to give effect to the legislative
intent In the absence of language so clear that it allows no room for construction, the courts will not ascribe to the Legislature an intention which is
contrary to general and well-established rules of justice and fairness.'" United
Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Joseph, 272 App. Div. 194, 201, 70 N.Y.S.2d 22, 28 (1st
Dep't 1947), aff'd mem., 297 N.Y. 1004, 80 N.E.2d 533 (1948), quoting
Sharkey v. Thurston, 268 N.Y. 123, 127, 196 N.E. 766, ,76 (1935); see
generally Dickerson, Symposium on Judicial Law Maki g in Relation to
Statutes: Introduction, 36 IND. L.J. 411, 413 (1961);
errill, Judicial Interpretation of Legislation, 32 OKLA. B.J. 1347, 1350 (161).
20 Cohen, Judicial "Legisputation" and the Dipnsions of Legislative
Meaning, 36 IND. L.J. 414, 416-17 (1961); see Comment, 8 STAN. L. REv.
293, 295-96, quoting CARDozo, PARADOXES OF THE L'EGAL SCIENcE 10 (1928),
where it was said: "A legislature can not anticipate every possible legal
problem. Neither can it do justice in novel cases after they have arisen.
This inherent limitation in the legislative process makes it essential that
there be some elasticity in the judicial process."
2"Health Dep't v. Rector, 145 N.Y. 32, 39, 39 N.E. 833, 835 (1895);
People v. Budd, 117 N.Y. 1, 14-15, 22 N.E. 670, 672 (1889), aff'd, 143 U.S.
517 (1892).
22 Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104, 111 (1911).
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that the statute as literally read is constitutional. However, even
if this position is correct, it would not adversely affect the
majority's holding, since they were justified in performing "judicial
surgery" based on the "drastic result" concept.
Even though damages are limited to the portion of exaggeration attributable to willfulness, the effectiveness of section 39-a
is still guaranteed. For example, if a lienor has a valid claim
for $10,000, but files a lien for $20,000-including in this $10,000
exaggeration, $2,000 due to honest, though mistaken belief, and
$8,000 due to willfulness-he will forfeit the lien and, in addition,
pay a penalty of $8,000. Under these circumstances a lienor
would be foolish to attempt to enforce the lien. If the lienor
does attempt to enforce an exaggerated lien, as a matter of legal
strategy, he might well be advised to discontinue his action if
the defendant-owner threatens to institute a counterclaim pursuant
to section 39-a, since a foreclosure proceeding is in fact a condition
precedent to the enforcement of the statute.
It is submitted that the majority's construction of section 39-a
still affords adequate protection to owners and contractors against
whom exaggerated liens have been filed. It also insulates lienors
from the sting of unnecessary penalties, which the legislature
probably did not intend. Thus, since there does not appear to be
direct comment or legislative history on the statute, the majority
was warranted in utilizing a construction 23process designed to
ascribe the most reasonable legislative intention

M
TAXATION NOT

SECTION

7605 (b) - INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

REQuIRED TO SHow PROBABLE CAUSE IN OBTAINING

SUB-

TAx REcoRms. - The Internal Revenue Service summoned one Powell to produce records concerning prior tax returns
made by a corporation of which Powell was president. Powell
refused to comply, claiming that since the three-year statute of
limitation had expired, the assessment must be predicated on fraud,'
and in order to examine the records for fraud there must be a
showing of "probable cause." The Supreme Court, in reversing
POENA

OF

23 Chief Judge Cardozo wrote that "the legislator has only a fragmentary
consciousness of the law" and when the question is one of fixing meaning
to the rules which he prescribes, one should search at their source, that is,
social utility. CARDOzo, THE: NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 122 (1932).
See generally Note, Statutory Doubts and Legislative Intention, 40 COLUm.
957, 970-74 (1940).
L REV.
1
See generally 5 RABKI N &
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 6501 (a), (c).
JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOmE, GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION §§ 76.01(1), (2)
(1964).

